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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA CONTRACT 
LAW 
ALEXANDRA P. EVERHART SICKLER* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article surveys cases involving the application and interpretation 
of North Dakota contract law from 2013 through 2016.  The majority of the 
cases discussed in this Article involve decisions from the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, though the Article also includes a handful of relevant 
decisions from the United States District Court for the District of North 
Dakota and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  This 
Article does not address every ruling from the survey period; rather, it 
includes only those cases that may be of interest to North Dakota attorneys, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article surveys cases involving the application and interpretation 
of North Dakota contract law from 2013 through 2016 and attempts to 
provide some concrete guidance to North Dakota attorneys who engage 
with contract law either in a transactional or litigation posture.  Much of the 
decisional law from the survey period reinforces longstanding contract law, 
but there are more than a few cases where the courts tread upon new 
ground. 
For example, decisions from the North Dakota Supreme Court on 
issues of contract formation, promissory estoppel doctrine, and the 
application of the parol evidence rule largely embrace existing contract law.  
In these areas, the factual context of the dispute or the court’s analysis is 
more noteworthy than the legal principles themselves. 
Attorneys may be more interested in recent decisions that announce 
new rules and affect future transactional behavior.  For example, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court interpreted a force majeure clause for the first time, 
setting forth a standard of interpretation for future disputes.  In another 
watershed decision, the Supreme Court declined to enforce a no-waiver 
clause in a contract based on the conduct of the parties.  While the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has held previously that parties can waive 
contractual provisions by conduct, it had not yet concluded that parties had 
waived a no-waiver clause. 
Decisional law from the survey period also reveals that interpretation 
prevails as the most commonly heard and litigated issue.  Those rulings 
encompassed general matters, such as applicability of the parol evidence 
rule and basic principles of contract interpretation.  The courts also 
announced specific rules about interpreting certain types of contractual 
clauses such as “no damage for delay” clauses, indemnification clauses, 
Pugh clauses, and rights of first refusal.  Many of these specific ruling 
affect oil and gas leases and construction contracts. 
The remainder of this Article discusses the cases examined from the 
survey period. The cases are divided into categories by issues. The first 
category of cases discusses issues relating to the formation of a contract. 
Second, this Article will address the continued viability of promissory 
estoppel as an independent basis for relief and foreshadow the possibility of 
a decision concerning third party promissory estoppel claims in the near 
future.  Third, this Article will discuss general and specific interpretation 
issues outlined above. The final category of cases examines contract 
defenses. 
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II.  FORMATION 
It is not uncommon for parties to litigate formation issues even though 
the basic legal principles are well-settled.  The context in which such issues 
arise is equally common: transactions that involve parties unrepresented by 
counsel on both sides or adhesion contracts. 
A.  PRICE AS AN ESSENTIAL TERM 
Two cases highlight the requirement that the contract price, i.e. the 
consideration, must be expressly stated without being open-ended. 
Lumley v. Kapusta reinforces the longstanding tenet of contract law 
requiring that the essential terms of a contract be sufficiently definite for a 
contract to be enforceable.1  In this case, the plaintiffs were tenant farmers 
of the defendant’s North Dakota property.2  The defendant lived in Virginia 
and wanted to sell her property, so in 2012, the parties had telephone 
conversations about a potential transaction.3  One of the plaintiffs told the 
defendant she would get an appraisal for the value of the property.4  Instead 
of an appraisal, she obtained an evaluation from a bank which expressly 
stated that it was not an appraisal and valued the property at $525,827.5 The 
plaintiffs sent the defendant a cashier’s check based on the bank’s 
evaluation, deeds to be executed by the defendant, and a note.6  The 
defendant endorsed and deposited the check in a bank and signed the deeds, 
but she did not return the executed deeds to the plaintiffs.7  Instead, she 
telephoned the plaintiffs and asked why there had been no appraisal of the 
property.8  Shortly afterward, the defendant returned the money to the 
plaintiffs.9  The plaintiffs sued for specific performance of their alleged oral 
contract.10 
Under longstanding North Dakota law, a contract can be enforced only 
when the parties have agreed on its essential terms, and price is an essential 
term.11  Further, the contract must fix price with certainty or provide a 
 
1.  Lumley v. Kapusta, 2016 ND 74, ¶ 7, 878 N.W.2d 65, 67. 
2.  Id. ¶ 2, 878 N.W.2d at 66. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. ¶ 3. 
7.  Kapusta, ¶ 3. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. ¶ 7, 878 N.W.2d at 67. 
         
2016] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA CONTRACT LAW 23 
 
method by which it can be fixed with certainty.12  Here, there was no 
evidence that the parties actually agreed on a purchase price for the 
property.13  No actual appraisal was performed.14  One of the plaintiffs 
testified at trial that she came up with the purchase price the day she wrote 
the check.15  Without an agreement as to the price to be paid for the 
property, there was no enforceable contract.16 
Contrast this holding with Limberg v. Sanford Medical Center Fargo, 
where the plaintiff, an emergency room patient, challenged an alleged open 
price term in the contract that all patients sign before receiving treatment, 
but lost because the contract unambiguously provided a method by which 
price can be fixed with sufficient certainty.17 
In Limberg, the plaintiff challenged a hospital’s contract as ambiguous, 
unfair, unconscionable, and unreasonable because the contract contained an 
open price term.18  The contract at issue required all patients to pay “all 
charges related to services provided by” the hospital and to adhere to the 
provider’s payment guidelines.19  These payment guidelines were made 
available to all patients.20  The contract did not list the exact price of the 
services; nonetheless, specific contract language controlled the price terms 
by referring to the payment guidelines.21  The payment guidelines, in turn, 
enumerated the full, undiscounted prices of the hospital’s services, which 
were higher than the prices paid by insured patients or those covered by 
Medicare or Medicaid.22  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that even 
though the price of each hospital service was not listed in the contract itself, 
the contract reference to the “rates” or the “charges” of a hospital was a 
sufficiently definite price term.23  The Supreme Court’s ruling followed the 
 
12.  Id. (citations omitted) (“[t]o be specifically enforceable, ‘[a] contract must fix the price 
or consideration clearly, definitely, certainly, and unambiguously, or provide a way by which it 
can be fixed with certainty.”). 
13.  Kapusta, ¶ 8, 878 N.W.2d at 67. 
14.  Id. ¶ 2, 878 N.W.2d at 66. 
15.  Id. ¶ 8, 878 N.W.2d at 67. 
16.  Id. ¶ 9, 878 N.W.2d at 68. 
17.  Limberg v. Sanford Med. Ctr. Fargo, 2016 ND 140, 881 N.W.2d 658. 
18.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 881 N.W.2d 658, 659-60. 
19.  Id. ¶ 10, 881 N.W.2d at 661. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. ¶ 12. 
22.  Id. ¶ 9. 
23.  Limberg, ¶¶ 11-13, 881 N.W.2d 658, 661-62. 
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majority approach to this issue; other jurisdictions across the nation have 
entertained substantially similar allegations with comparable outcomes.24 
This type of formation issue, namely failure to state an essential term, 
such as price, is not likely to present in an arm’s length transaction 
negotiated between parties of relatively equal sophistication who are 
represented by counsel.  These cases are noteworthy because of the context 
in which the issue arose.  In the first instance, the parties bargained and 
attempted to reach an agreement without advice of counsel, and in the 
second, the contract is one of adhesion, wherein one party lacked 
opportunity to bargain.  These types of cases will likely continue to arise, 
and their outcomes merit monitoring by counsel, particularly where the 
client is a company that interacts with consumers in an adhesion context. 
B.  ENFORCEABLE MODIFICATION 
There were a few rulings during the survey period which reveal that 
parties, as a litigation strategy, occasionally characterize certain 
performance conduct as an enforceable modification to an existing contract.  
Cloaking contracting behavior in this way is rarely successful, perhaps 
because in North Dakota, statutory law controls how to effectively modify a 
written contract unless the parties agree otherwise.25  The statute provides a 
clear starting point for a court’s analysis and affords little flexibility to 
maneuver around it. 
The North Dakota statute provides that a written agreement may be 
altered by a writing “or by an executed oral agreement and not 
otherwise.”26  It further provides that “[a]n oral agreement is executed 
within the meaning of this section whenever the party performing has 
incurred a detriment which that party was not obligated by the original 
contract to incur.”27  Put otherwise, an oral agreement is executed when the 
performing party has furnished some consideration independent from the 
original agreement for the change.  The statute’s execution requirement 
appears to codify the common law preexisting legal duty rule for oral 
modifications.28  That rule requires independent consideration to support a 
 
24.  See, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2008); Nygaard v. 
Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 2007 SD 34, ¶ 16, 731 N.W.2d 184, 192; Shelton v. Duke 
Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 113, 115-16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
25.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–06 (2015). 
26.  Id. (emphasis added). 
27.  Id. 
28.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (Amer. Law Inst. 1981) (“Performance 
of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is 
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modification to avoid the risk that assent to a change is coerced or given 
gratuitously.29  Per the statute, an unexecuted oral modification of a written 
contract—one that remains entirely promissory on both sides30—is 
invalid.31 
Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, involves a party asserting a 
modification argument as an unsuccessful litigation strategy.32  There, the 
Seatons entered into an oil and gas lease with Gadeco covering property in 
Williams County.33  The lease had a five-year term and contained a 
continuing operations clause.34  This clause enabled Gadeco to extend the 
initial term of the lease if no more than ninety days elapsed between 
completing or abandoning one well and beginning to drill a subsequent 
one.35 
Before the five-year initial term on the Gadeco lease expired, the 
Seatons entered into an oil and gas top lease with Valentina Exploration, 
LLC (“Valentina”).36  In March 2012, a Gadeco land manager mailed a 
letter to the Seatons invoking the continuing operations clause for some 
sections of the leased land, while also acknowledging that the lease, per its 
express terms, would expire as to sections where no wells had been 
drilled.37  In litigation, Valentina claimed that this letter constituted an 
enforceable modification of the existing lease.38 
As stated, in North Dakota, parties may modify a written contract by 
another written contract, but for Gadeco’s letter to constitute an effective 
modification, all of the elements for a valid contract must be present, 
including an offer, an acceptance of the offer, and sufficient consideration.39  
The letter did not satisfy the first requirement, namely that it contain an 
 
not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required 
by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain.”). 
29.  See id., cmt. a. 
30.  Foster v. Furlong, 8 ND 282, 78 N.W. 986, 987 (1899). 
31.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–06 (2015).  See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–05 (2015) 
(providing that oral agreements may be modified “by consent of the parties in writing without 
independent consideration” to support the modification). 
32.  Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 2016 ND 84, ¶ 26, 878 N.W.2d 397, 404-05. 
33.  Id. ¶ 2, 878 N.W.2d at 399. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. ¶ 3 (quoting Sandwick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, ¶ 4, 747 N.W.2d 519, 521).  A top 
lease is “a lease granted by a landowner during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is 
to become effective if and when the existing lease expires or is terminated.”  Id. 
37.  Id. ¶ 4. 
38.  Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶ 15, 878 N.W.2d at 402. 
39.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015). 
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offer to modify Gadeco’s rights under the lease.40  The letter only 
incorrectly summarized the lease terms; nothing indicated an objective offer 
to modify the lease’s terms in any respect, including concerning Gadeco’s 
drilling rights under the continuing operations clause.41  Accordingly, 
Valentina’s modification argument failed.42 
This case represents a trend in the decisional law that shows parties 
trying to cloak contracting behavior as a modification to the original terms 
of the contract.  In this case, Valentina likely had a good faith basis for 
asserting that an enforceable modification required a particular result, but 
that argument relied on an extremely weak premise.  Similarly, in 
Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Company, one party tried 
unsuccessfully to enforce a purported oral modification to the payment 
terms in a written agreement for the purchase of land.43  In that case, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court declined to enforce the purported 
modification because it was unexecuted44—neither party had “incurred a 
detriment which that party was not obligated by the original contract to 
incur.”45 
Counsel should keep in mind that contract law emphasizes mutual 
assent with regard to contract modifications.46  North Dakota, in particular, 
unequivocally requires bilateral consent to contract modifications, without 
regard to whether the original contract is in writing or oral.47  Its decisional 
law—as witnessed in the Gadeco ruling—requires an offer and an 
acceptance to effectively change a written agreement via a writing.48  Its 
statute concerning modification of an oral agreement likewise emphasizes 
mutual assent.49  It permits contract modifications to oral agreements either 
in writing without independent consideration to support the alteration or 
 
40.  Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶ 28, 878 N.W.2d at 405. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, 882 N.W.2d 238.  See also infra 
Section III.B. 
44.  Id. ¶ 21, 882 N.W.2d at 246. 
45.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–06 (2015). 
46.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on 
Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 203-04 (1997) (“Contract law permits parties to 
modify contractual terms by mutual agreement. . . . [T]he prerogative of contractors to modify 
their original contract by mutual agreement is an article of faith for contract law.”). 
47.  See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-09-05, 9-09-06 (2015). 
48.  Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, 2016 ND 84, ¶ 28, 878 N.W.2d 397, 405. 
49.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-05 (2015) provides that “[a] contract not in writing may be 
altered in any respect by consent of the parties in writing without a new consideration, or by oral 
consent of the parties with a new consideration, and is extinguished thereby to the extent of the 
alteration.” 
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orally with independent consideration.50  North Dakota statute also ensures 
mutual assent for oral modifications to written agreements, by requiring 
they be executed, meaning that one party at least has performed the promise 
that constitutes consideration for the modification.51  That requirement of 
independent consideration developed at common law to ensure one party 
did not obtain contract modifications through coercion.52 
From a transactional perspective, counsel and contracting parties in 
North Dakota should adhere to mutuality as a touchstone for creating 
enforceable contract modifications.  Likewise, in litigation, counsel should 
ensure they have a good faith basis for making a modification argument and 
look for the existence of bilateral consent as a guiding principle. 
III.  PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
North Dakota courts continue to embrace promissory estoppel as an 
independent basis for relief.53  In North Dakota, as in other states, a party 
must establish four elements to successfully invoke promissory estoppel as 
a claim: “1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect will 
cause the promisee to change his position; 2) a substantial change of the 
promisee’s position through action, or forbearance; 3) justifiable reliance on 
the promise; and 4) injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the 
promise.”54  As explained below, the tension points in these cases mostly 
turn on whether a clear, definite promise has been made and whether there 
has been substantial and justifiable reliance.55 
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the ability of a 
party to invoke promissory estoppel to preclude the other party from 
successfully asserting the statute of frauds as a defense to enforcement of an 
oral agreement.56  It declined, however, to decide whether to permit third-
party promissory estoppel despite having two opportunities to do so in the 
last decade.57 
 
50.  Id. 
51.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015). 
52.  See Alaska Packers Ass’n. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
53.  For an extensive discussion and analysis of promissory estoppel case decisions in North 
Dakota through 1990, see Thomas C. Folsom, Reconsidering the Reliance Rules: The Restatement 
of Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota, 66 N.D. L. REV. 317 (1990). 
54.  Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 2016 ND 84, ¶ 25, 878 N.W.2d 397, 404. 
55.  See Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 2016 ND 84, 878 N.W.2d 397; Thimjon 
Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 2013 ND 160, 837 N.W.2d 327. 
56.  See infra Section III.B. 
57.  See infra Section III.C. 
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A.  REQUIREMENT OF A CLEAR, DEFINITE PROMISE 
Any party asserting promissory estoppel in North Dakota must satisfy 
the first requirement of a clear and definite promise before a court will 
consider a party’s ability to successfully invoke the doctrine.58  In Valentina 
Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, the plaintiff, in a suit to quiet title subject to 
an oil and gas lease, unsuccessfully argued that promissory estoppel barred 
the defendant from extending the lease’s primary term under a continuing 
operations clause.59  Specifically, the plaintiff tried to argue that a written 
statement by the defendant’s representative in a letter to the lessors was a 
promise to terminate the lease if no wells had been drilled by a specified 
date.60  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the letter from the 
defendant’s land manager to the lessors did not contain a clear, definite, and 
unambiguous promise to terminate its rights under the lease agreement if no 
wells had been drilled.61  Rather, the letter merely contained an incorrect 
summary of the lease terms, which did nothing to negate the defendant’s 
drilling rights under the continuing operations clause in the lease.62  Similar 
to its modification argument, Valentina’s premise for the argument that a 
promise was made was relatively thin.63  This case is a cautionary tale: 
counsel should avoid resting a promissory estoppel claim on a weak 
assertion that a promise exists. 
B.  EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The North Dakota Supreme Court continues to embrace promissory 
estoppel as an exception to North Dakota’s statute of frauds.64  Recent 
decisions reinforce the difficulty of successfully asserting promissory 
estoppel as a shield to a statute of frauds defense.  The two cases 
highlighted here are noteworthy for counsel: the first, Knorr v. Norberg, 
demonstrates the extraordinary degree of reliance a plaintiff must show to 
 
58.  Thimjon Farms P’ship, ¶ 17, 837 N.W.2d at 335; Lohse v. Atl. Richfield Co., 389 
N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D. 1986) (“We agree with those courts which require that the promise or 
agreement be clear, definite, and unambiguous as to essential terms before the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce an agreement or to award damages for the breach 
thereof.”). 
59.  Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶¶ 24-27, 878 N.W.2d at 403-04.  For case facts, see supra 
Part II.B. 
60.  Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶¶ 4, 9, 878 N.W.2d at 399, 400. 
61.  Id. ¶ 26, 878 N.W.2d at 404. 
62.  Id. 
63.  See supra Section II.B. 
64.  North Dakota recognized promissory estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds as 
early as 1976.  See Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 740 (N.D. 1976). 
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defeat a statute of frauds defense;65 the second, Constellation Development, 
LLC v. Western Trust Company, underscores the interconnection between 
oral modifications and the statute of frauds.66 
1.  Knorr v. Norberg 
In Knorr v. Norberg, promissory estoppel took an oral lease agreement 
out of the statute of frauds.67  Under North Dakota’s statute of frauds, a 
lease agreement for a period longer than one year must be in writing to be 
enforceable.68  Parties in North Dakota may overcome the statute of frauds 
as a bar to enforcement of a contract where there is an enforceable oral 
agreement between the parties.69 
Here, the tenants sued their son-in-law landlord seeking to enforce a 
buy-back option contained in a lease.70  Tenants, Robert and Cheri Knorr, 
owned a lake home.71  They fell behind on their mortgage payments and 
reached out to family members for help.72  They sold their house to their 
daughter and son-in-law, Alonna and Jon Norberg, then leased it back with 
an option to purchase.73  The Knorrs apparently executed the lease with the 
option and sent it to the Norbergs, and Alonna testified that she signed it 
and saw Jon sign it, but that written lease was never found.74  Less than a 
year later, the Knorrs notified the Norbergs that they intended to exercise 
the buy-back option.75  By this time, Alonna and Jon had separated, and Jon 
denied that there was any repurchase option.76 
The Knorrs sued to recover the home, and the district court held that 
there was an oral option to repurchase the home which was enforceable 
under the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.77  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this ruling after engaging in a 
 
65.  Knorr v. Norberg, 2015 ND 284, 872 N.W.2d 323. 
66.  Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, 882 N.W.2d 238. 
67.  Knorr, ¶ 9, 872 N.W.2d at 326. 
68.  Id. ¶ 8 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–06–04(3) (2015)). 
69.  Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 124, 127 (N.D. 1982)). 
70.  Id. ¶ 1, 872 N.W.2d at 324. 
71.  Id. ¶ 2, 872 N.W.2d at 325. 
72.  Id.  
73.  Knorr, ¶ 2, 872 N.W.2d at 325. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. ¶ 3. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. 
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lengthy and thorough analysis of the extraordinary degree of reliance 
present in the factual record.78 
Counsel should heed the type of factual record present here that 
justified invoking promissory estoppel to take an oral option agreement out 
of the statute of frauds.  Factors critical to the Knorrs’ success are their 
substantial and justifiable reliance and the injustice that would result absent 
enforcement of the promise. 
The district court found, and the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed, 
that the Knorrs had substantially changed their position by transferring the 
house to the Norbergs in reliance on the Norbergs’ promise to sell back the 
home.79  Testimony indicated that the Knorrs had discussed their financial 
situation with their children and their children’s spouses in reliance on a 
relationship of trust.80  Robert Knorr also testified he would not have 
transferred the house without a buy-back option.81 
The Supreme Court also found both parties justifiably relied on that 
promise because the parties’ behavior at all times was consistent with an 
intent to return the house to the Knorrs.82  As with the Knorrs’ change in 
position, the relevant testimony was clear that the Knorrs would not have 
transferred the house to the Norbergs without the buy-back option.83  
Further, Jon Norberg testified that he agreed to buy the house only to 
financially help the Knorrs without any intent to buy it for business or 
investment purposes.84  The Supreme Court also noted from the record that 
the Norbergs had never received any keys to the home, which is consistent 
with an intent not to keep it.85 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s review found that evidence from the trial 
record substantially supported the conclusion that enforcement of the 
promise was required to prevent injustice.86  For example, Jon Norberg 
never paid for the mortgage even though it was in his name.87  The Knorrs 
made all necessary payments and paid all costs associated with the 
property.88  Thus, to decline to enforce the Norbergs’ promise to sell the 
 
78.  Id. ¶ 20, 872 N.W.2d at 329. 
79.  Knorr, ¶ 15, 872 N.W.2d at 327-28. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. at 328. 
82.  Id. ¶ 16. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Knorr, ¶ 16, 872 N.W.2d 323, 328. 
86.  Id. ¶ 18. 
87.  Id. ¶ 17. 
88.  Id. 
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home back to the Knorrs in the face of those facts would have been an 
injustice. 
This case isolates two of the crucial elements of promissory estoppel—
reliance and injustice—and leverages a factual record replete with evidence 
demonstrating the plaintiff’s substantial reliance on the Norberg’s oral 
promise to reconvey the property to overcome a misplaced writing.  
Further, the degree of reliance is, as is typical in these cases, in direct 
proportion to the injustice that would result absent enforcement of the 
promise.  Real property—home ownership—is at stake.  That, combined 
with the intra-family nature of the promise and the potential bad faith of Jon 
Norberg lurking in the background, made this case well-suited to the use of 
promissory estoppel to take the agreement out of the statute of frauds. 
2.  Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Co. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to enforce an unexecuted 
(i.e. entirely promissory) oral agreement to modify a written agreement 
involving the transfer of real property based on estoppel principles in 
Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Company.89  On 
September 30, 2013, Constellation agreed, in writing, to purchase about 
twenty-four acres of land from Western.90  The agreement also included a 
three-year option to purchase additional acreage.91  Constellation notified 
Western in writing of its intent to exercise this option.92  The parties agreed 
in writing on September 5, 2014, to the purchase of the additional 
property.93  Constellation gave Western two checks to pay for the purchase, 
but each was returned for insufficient funds.94  As a result of the bad 
checks, Western notified Constellation in writing that Western was 
terminating the purchase agreement.95  Constellation sued Western to 
enforce the purchase agreement under theories of equitable and promissory 
estoppel and alleged that the parties had orally extended the payment terms 
provided in that agreement.96 
Constellation effectively sought to enforce an unexecuted oral 
extension of the purchase agreement by promissory estoppel as an 
 
89.  Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, ¶ 21, 882 N.W.2d 238, 246. 
90.  Id. ¶ 2. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. ¶ 3. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 5, 882 N.W.2d at 240-41. 
96.  Id. 
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exception to the statute of frauds.97  The purchase agreement did not specify 
how the parties could change its terms, so Section 9–09–06 of the North 
Dakota Century Code (“the Code”) dictated the enforceability of any 
modifications.98  It provides: 
A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing or by 
an executed oral agreement and not otherwise. An oral agreement 
is executed within the meaning of this section whenever the party 
performing has incurred a detriment which that party was not 
obligated by the original contract to incur.99 
The purchase agreement here was in writing and complied with North 
Dakota’s statute of frauds.100  And the Supreme Court has previously 
allowed promissory estoppel to prevent the assertion of the statute of frauds 
as a defense where there is an executed oral agreement between the parties 
per the Code.101  But in this case, the Court held that a party may not invoke 
promissory estoppel to take an unexecuted oral agreement (or, in this case, 
an unexecuted oral modification) out of the statute of frauds.102 
This case illustrates at least one limit to a party’s ability to use 
promissory estoppel to escape the statute of frauds.  According to the 
Supreme Court, an oral modification of a written contract concerning the 
lease or sale of real property must be executed to take it out of the statute of 
frauds based on estoppel grounds.103  Executed means that one party must 
have incurred a legal detriment not provided for in the original 
agreement.104  Constellation, however, alleged an unexecuted oral 
modification of the written purchase agreement concerning payment terms 
and was therefore unsuccessful in taking the purported extension out of the 
statute of frauds.105  Counsel should view this decision as part of a broader 
context in which the Supreme Court appears reluctant to agree with counsel 
who characterize certain contracting behavior as contract modifications that 
must be enforced.106 
 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015) (emphasis added). 
100.  Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-04(3) 
(2015). 
101.  Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245. 
102.  Id. ¶ 21, 882 N.W.2d at 246. 
103.  Id. ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245.  See also supra Section II.B for a discussion about 
creating enforceable contract modifications in North Dakota in non-Article 2 transactions. 
104.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015). 
105.  Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245. 
106.  See supra Section II.B. 
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C.  THIRD PARTY PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIMS 
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined two relatively recent 
opportunities to address whether a third party may enforce a promise under 
the promissory estoppel doctrine: Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First 
International Bank & Trust107 and University Hotel Development, L.L.C. v. 
Dusterhoft Oil, Inc.108 
Under the theory of third party promissory estoppel, a third party to an 
unfulfilled promise may sue for damages suffered as a result of reasonable 
reliance on that promise.109  Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts contemplates third party promissory estoppel claims.110  It 
provides: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if 
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.111 
The majority of promissory estoppel rulings does not involve third 
party claims, but there is enough decisional law from other jurisdictions to 
inform North Dakota courts and counsel about the availability and limits to 
these types of claims.112  A tension point among the existing decisions turns 
on whether to limit recovery to those persons who would be considered 
third party beneficiaries under contract law or to permit a broader range of 
third party plaintiffs to obtain promissory estoppel relief.113  The 
Restatement favors the broader view: it refers to third parties who are the 
intended beneficiaries of a promise as well as others who may foreseeably 
rely on a promise and act (or refrain from acting) accordingly.114  It reports 
that courts have allowed this type of promissory estoppel claim where the 
third party was a beneficiary of the promise at issue.115  And it states that, in 
 
107.  Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 2013 ND 160, 837 N.W.2d 327. 
108.  Univ. Hotel Dev., LLC v. Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., 2006 ND 121, 715 N.W.2d 153. 
109.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. (emphasis added). 
112.  See Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., No. 04 Civ. 2128(PKL), 2005 WL 991772 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005). 
113.  See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 
42 SW. L.J. 931, 966-67 (1988); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The 
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 61 (1981). 
114.  Id. cmt. c. 
115.  Id. 
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rare cases, promissory estoppel might be permitted for third parties that 
were not beneficiaries of the promise.116  A few courts have agreed.117 
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to entertain this issue of 
first impression, namely the availability of third party promissory estoppel 
as a basis for relief, in Thimjon Farms118 and in Dusterhoft.119  It was 
unnecessary to resolve the issue because in both instances an essential 
element of the promissory estoppel claim was missing.  There was no 
justifiable reliance in Thimjon Farms,120 and the allegations in Dusterhoft 
failed to satisfy the requirement of a clear, definite promise.121  
Nonetheless, the issue is likely to present itself again, particularly as 
promissory estoppel continues to thrive as an independent basis of relief.122  
Any counsel contemplating a third party promissory estoppel claim should 
be prepared to address the extent to which North Dakota courts should 
protect third party reliance, using decisional law from other jurisdictions as 
guideposts. 
IV.  INTERPRETATION: GENERAL ISSUES 
Contract interpretation remains the most commonly litigated matter in 
contract disputes.  Decisional law from the survey period encompasses 
general issues of contract interpretation under North Dakota law.  General 
issues addressed by relevant courts concern the applicability of the parol 
evidence rules and general rules of interpretation. 
 
116.  Id. 
117.  See, e.g., von Kaulbach v. Keoseian, 783 F.Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Silberman v. 
Roethe, 218 N.W.2d 723, 731-32 (Wisc. 1974) (“We can see no reason to limit recovery to those 
persons who would be considered third party beneficiaries under contract law if this is what the 
proposed comment suggests.  If the plaintiff can prove the essential facts he should not be 
precluded from recovery as a third party reasonably relying on promises made to others.”).  Cf. 
C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Sterling-Salem Corp., 507 F.2d 319, 322 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that 
reliance protection should be accorded only to a third party having complete privity with 
promisor). 
118.  Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 2013 ND 160, 837 N.W.2d 327. 
119.  Univ. Hotel Dev., LLC v. Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., 2006 ND 121, 715 N.W.2d 153. 
120.  Thimjon Farms P’ship, ¶19, 837 N.W.2d at 335-36. 
121.  Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., ¶16, 715 N.W.2d at 157. 
122.  See Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory 
Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 531 (2002) (concluding, through an empirical study, that promissory estoppel continues to 
be a vital aspect of contract law). 
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A.  ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE 
The following decisions reflect confusion concerning the admissibility 
of extrinsic evidence with regard to written agreements.  Under North 
Dakota law, the parol evidence rule is a statutory rule of law that precludes 
a party from using evidence of prior oral negotiations and agreements to 
vary the terms of a written agreement.123  The law permits a party to 
introduce such extrinsic evidence, notwithstanding the rule, for many 
reasons including without limitation to demonstrate fraud, mutual mistake, 
failure of consideration, and grounds for rescission or reformation.124  Cases 
from the survey period encompassed all of these exceptions to the parol 
evidence rule. 
1.  Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske 
In Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the lower court, which failed to acknowledge 
that extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud even where the evidence 
contradicts the written agreement.125  In this case, an oil and gas lessee sued 
to quiet title to leased mineral interests while the lessors counterclaimed for 
rescission of the leases based on the lessee’s fraudulent 
misrepresentations.126  The district court had entered summary judgment for 
the lessee, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
consideration of the lessors’ allegations that they were induced to lease 
based on the lessee’s misrepresentations.127 
The parties extensively negotiated the leases.128  The lessors’ claimed 
that during negotiations the lessee made numerous material 
misrepresentations to induce them to lease their interests to the lessee rather 
than to another company that had offered leases on more favorable financial 
terms.129  The district court held that evidence of some of the lessee’s 
alleged misrepresentations—namely those indicating that it “intended to 
 
123.  Section 9-06-07 provides that “[t]he execution of a contract in writing, whether the law 
requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its 
matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-
06-07 (2015). 
124.  Parol evidence, however, may not be used to supply a missing essential term of the 
agreement and take the agreement outside of the statute of frauds.  See Trosen v. Trosen, 2014 ND 
7, ¶14, 841 N.W.2d 687, 691. 
125.  Golden Eye Res., LLC v. Ganske, 2014 ND 179, ¶¶ 1, 19, 853 N.W.2d 544, 547, 552. 
126.  Id. ¶ 6, 853 N.W.2d at 548. 
127.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 853 N.W.2d at 548-49. 
128.  Id. ¶ 3, 853 N.W.2d at 547. 
129.  Id.  
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drill and operate the wells itself” and “suggesting the [lessors’] property 
would be drilled first”—contradicted the leases’ express terms and were 
inadmissible parol evidence.130 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed because the district court 
erroneously applied the parol evidence rule.131  It explained that oral 
statements are permitted to show fraudulent inducement even though the 
proffered evidence contradicts the written agreement.132  The lessors sought 
to introduce the extrinsic evidence to show that the lessee fraudulently 
induced them to enter into the leases.  The district court’s misapplication of 
the rule suggests that parol evidence best practices for counsel should 
encompass a checklist of circumstances in which the rule does not apply. 
2. Brash v. Gulleson 
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently affirmed the admissibility 
of parol evidence to prove a failure of consideration as well.  In Brash v. 
Gulleson, Brash’s widow sued Gulleson for breach of contract, alleging that 
Gulleson breached a cow/calf production lease agreement when he returned 
only seven cows of what she believed to be a herd of 130.133  The deceased 
Brash and Gulleson executed a written lease in 2000 pursuant to which 
Brash agreed to provide 130 cows to be cared for on Gulleson’s farm; in 
return, Gulleson agreed to pay Brash forty percent of the calf crop each 
year.134  Gulleson asserted failure of consideration based on extrinsic 
evidence that the actual number of cows in the Brash herd fell well below 
the 130 cows required by the contract.135  The district court permitted the 
extrinsic evidence to demonstrate failure of consideration, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed.136 
 
130.  Id. ¶ 15, 853 N.W.2d at 550. 
131.  Ganske, ¶ 19, 853 N.W.2d at 552. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Brash v. Gulleson, 2014 ND 156, ¶¶ 1, 4, 24, 835 N.W.2d 798, 800, 805-06. 
134.  Id. ¶ 4, 835 N.W.2d at 800. 
135.  Id. ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d at 801. 
136.  Id. ¶¶ 16, 25, 835 N.W.2d at 803, 806; see also Four Season’s Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v. 
Linderkamp, 2013 ND 159, ¶ 13, 837 N.W.2d 147, 153 (“The rule is also well settled that the 
acknowledgment of the receipt of a consideration in a deed or other written contract is not 
conclusive, but it may be shown by parol that the consideration agreed upon has not been paid; or 
that a consideration greater or lesser than, or different from, that expressed in the deed was in fact 
agreed upon.”). 
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3. Friedig v. Weed 
Likewise, in Friedig v. Weed, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the admissibility of parol evidence to prove mutual mistake and 
obtain reformation of a deed.137  In this case, the parties disagreed about 
whether the sale of a lakefront lot included the tract of land just below the 
water’s edge.138  Circumstantial extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent was 
found to support a finding that the grantor intended to convey land below 
the water’s edge to the grantee.139 
The Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the use of circumstantial parol 
evidence to prove mutual mistake is noteworthy here.140  Initially, the Court 
acknowledged a high standard for use of parol evidence to prove mutual 
mistake: such evidence “must be clear, satisfactory, specific, and 
convincing, and a court of equity will not grant reformation upon a mere 
preponderance of evidence, but only upon certainty of error.”141  Then, 
relying on decisional law from other jurisdictions, it permitted use of  
circumstantial evidence of the parties’ intent to dictate its holding.142  
Acknowledging that circumstantial evidence can satisfy the clear and 
convincing standard for purposes of mutual mistake is new, but not 
necessarily a departure from the Supreme Court’s past practice.143  It simply 
appears to be adopting a rule that already exists in other jurisdictions.144 
B. CONDUCT NEGATED NO-WAIVER CLAUSE 
In Savre v. Santoyo, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a party 
waived his rights under a contract by failing to exercise them even though 
the contract contained an express no-waiver clause.145  A no-waiver clause 
attempts to preserve a party’s rights and remedies under a contract if that 
 
137.  Freidig v. Weed, 2015 ND 215, ¶ 11, 868 N.W.2d 546, 559. 
138.  Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 868 N.W.2d at 548. 
139.  Id. ¶ 8. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. ¶ 12, 868 N.W.2d at 549. 
142.  Id. at 549-50 (“Some courts have said circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient 
to clearly and convincingly establish grounds for reformation. Lister v. Sorge, 260 Cal.App.2d 
333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 63, 66–67 (1968) (grounds for reformation must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence and reformation may be based solely on circumstantial evidence); Lunceford 
v. Houghtlin, 326 S.W.3d 53, 64 (Mo.Ct.App.2010) (circumstantial evidence may establish mutual 
mistake provided the natural and reasonable inferences clearly and decidedly prove the 
mistake).”). 
143.  Freidig, ¶ 12, 868 N.W.2d at 549-50. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Savre v. Santoyo, 2015 ND 170, ¶ 15, 865 N.W.2d 419, 425. 
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party fails to take action in response to a breach of contract.146  Such clauses 
are generally considered boilerplate and are included in many different 
types of contracts. 
In this case, Savre owned and operated an auto repair business, and 
leased property from Santoyo to operate the business starting in June 
2008.147  About two years into the lease, the parties executed a lease-to-
purchase option agreement with respect to the property.148  Savre could 
exercise the option to purchase the property, provided he satisfied certain 
terms and conditions in the agreement.149  The contract also contained a no-
waiver clause that provided: “No modification of or amendment to this 
Option to Purchase Agreement, nor any waiver of any rights under this 
Option to Purchase Agreement, will be effective unless in writing signed by 
the party to be charged.”150 
Savre satisfied many, but not all, of the terms and conditions required 
to exercise the option.151  For example, he was often late in his rent 
payments, an event of default under the option agreement entitling Santoyo 
to terminate it.152  Santoyo, however, failed to exercise this right.153  He 
also failed to respond to Savre’s properly provided notice of his intent to 
exercise the option and evicted Savre.154  Following eviction, Savre sued for 
breach of the option agreement.155 
Key to the decision here is the applicability of a no-waiver clause in the 
option agreement.  This clause declared any waiver of rights under the 
contract ineffective unless in writing and signed by the party against whom 
waiver is sought to be enforced.156  Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 
Santoyo, by his conduct, waived his rights under the option agreement, 
including the no-waiver clause, when he failed to terminate the lease 
 
146.  See Sayre, ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 422-23 (quoting a contract provision that stated that 
waiver of any contract terms had to be in writing, not oral or by conduct); Kessel v. W. Sav. 
Credit Union, 463 N.W.2d 629, 631 (N.D. 1990) (explaining the effect of a no-waiver clause 
where enforced); BANKS, NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW § 28:7 (2015) (“Parties may limit the 
effect of a course of conduct inconsistent with the contract’s terms by employing a no-waiver 
provision stating that the failure of either party to enforce any provision of the agreement shall not 
be deemed a waiver of such party’s right to enforce such provision in the future.”). 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. ¶¶ 4-6, 865 N.W.2d at 423. 
152.  Sayre, ¶ 4, 865 N.W.2d at 423. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. ¶ 5. 
155.  Id. ¶ 6. 
156.  Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 422-23. 
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agreement based on Savre’s repeated late rent payments, which were events 
of default under the contract.157 
Relevant to the court’s ruling was evidence showing that Santoyo 
accepted late monthly payments, and that Savre attempted to exercise the 
purchase option believing he had made sufficient payments under the 
agreement.158  The evidence also showed that Santoyo did nothing to 
exercise his remedies with respect to Savre’s repeated defaults before Savre 
attempted to exercise the option.159  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
upheld the district court’s finding that Santoyo, by his conduct, had waived 
strict compliance with the option agreement terms.160 
Here, the Supreme Court elevated performance over express terms.  
Arguably, where the clause is unambiguous, the parties are of relatively 
equal sophistication, and have mutually assented to the term, a no-waiver 
clause should be enforced.  That said, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
previously that parties, by their conduct, may waive contractual rights.161  
The distinctive feature of Savre is that the Supreme Court concluded that a 
party waived a no-waiver clause.162  It found that Santoyo engaged in a 
pattern of conduct that potentially altered Savre’s reasonable expectations 
about the agreement’s terms, thereby justifying non-enforcement of the no-
waiver clause.163 
It is not unusual for courts to ignore no-waiver clauses and enforce the 
contract according to how the parties have performed rather than the 
dictates of standard boilerplate.  Counsel should be aware that North 
Dakota courts appear willing to alter the effect of written contract terms, 
including no-waiver clauses, based on the parties’ conduct and should 
advise parties to behave accordingly.  For example, if the landlord becomes 
aware of a default or accepts late payment, it should notify the tenant in 
 
157.  Id. ¶ 7, 865 N.W.2d at 423. 
158.  Sayre, ¶¶ 4, 18, 865 N.W.2d at 423, 425. 
159.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 18, 865 N.W.2d at 423, 425. 
160.  Id. ¶ 25, 865 N.W.2d at 427; see also id. ¶ 21, 865 N.W.2d at 426 (quoting Pfeifle v. 
Tanabe, 2000 ND 219, ¶ 18, 620 N.W.2d 167, 172 (emphasis added)) (explaining that “[w]aiver 
may be established either by an express agreement or by inference from acts or conduct.”); id. 
(quoting Pfeifle, ¶ 18, 620 N.W.2d at 172) (explaining that “[w]aiver may be found from an 
unexplained delay in enforcing contractual rights or accepting performance different than called 
for by the contract” though ultimately concluding that the tenant had not waived the right to 
terminate the contract); Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 191 (N.D. 1977). 
161.  See Pfeifle, ¶ 18, 620 N.W.2d at 172. 
162.  See Kessel v. W. Sav. Credit Union, 463 N.W.2d 629, 631 (N.D. 1990) (declining to 
decide whether a no-waiver clause may be waived because the record did not contain factual 
evidence which could constitute a waiver). 
163.  See generally Savre, 2015 ND 170, 865 N.W.2d 419. 
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writing that it is not waiving the default and reserves all of its rights and 
remedies under the contract.  The notice should include a specific reference 
to any no-waiver clause in the contract in order to bolster, if not inoculate, a 
party against an argument in a later dispute that conduct led to waiver.  This 
strategy may have led to a different result for Santoyo. 
V.  INTERPRETATION: SPECIFIC ISSUES 
The courts’ rulings from the survey period concerning specific types of 
contracts clauses yield perhaps the most practical considerations for 
counsel.  The types of clauses reviewed include no damage for delay 
clauses, indemnification and hold harmless clauses, force majeure clauses, 
Pugh clauses, and right of first offer and first refusal clauses. 
A.  LIMITING NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY CLAUSES 
In 2014, North Dakota joined a number of other states that limit the 
negative effect of no damages for delay clauses where an owner’s active 
interference is the cause of the delay.164  A no damages for delay clause 
exculpates an owner for liability for damages resulting from delays in the 
performance of a contractor’s work.165  A typical clause, found in both 
private and public contracts, may state: 
No payment or compensation shall be made for damages resulting 
from hindrances or delays in the progress of the work, whether 
such hindrances or delays are avoidable or unavoidable.  A delay 
caused either wholly or in part by the actions of someone other 
than the contractor shall only entitle the contractor to an extension 
of time.166 
Parties include these clauses to shift the risk of delay costs from owners 
(or their agents) to contractors.167  It provides an owner a contractual 
defense against claims by contractors and subcontractors for delay 
damages.168  The plain language of a typical clause appears to prohibit 
contractors from recovering extra costs caused by a delay, even where the 
 
164.  C & C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County, 2014 ND 128, 848 N.W.2d 
709. 
165.  No Damage for Delay: A Work of Contractual Fiction, WELLE LAW (June 20, 2014), 
http://wellelaw.com/2014/06/. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
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owner causes the delay.169  Some states, such as Minnesota, have prohibited 
such clauses by statute, at least in public contracts, on the basis that they are 
unfair and against public policy.170  Most states, however, will enforce a no 
damage for delay clause unless the delay results from active interference by 
the owner.171 
In C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County, the prime 
contractor sued the county project owner for additional costs incurred as a 
result of delays in the construction of a law enforcement center.172  The 
contract contained a no damages for delay clause.173  In this case, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court adopted the active interference exception to the 
enforceability of a no damages for delay clause.174  The active interference 
exception acknowledges that a contract contains an implied duty by the 
owner (or his agent) to refrain from doing anything which would 
unreasonably interfere with the contractor’s ability to timely and effectively 
complete the work.175  Here, the property owner’s agent (the construction 
manager) caused additional delays in the project when he ordered 
steelworkers to erect steel anywhere to create the illusion of progress on the 
project rather than use the conventional “inside-out” method.176  Despite the 
presence of a no damages for delay clause in the contract, the Supreme 
Court awarded the contractor extra costs because the owner’s representative 
actively interfered with the work.177 
The Supreme Court adopted the active interference exception in C&C 
Plumbing about two years after it affirmed the enforceability of a no 
damages for delay clause in Markwed Excavating, Inc. v. City of 
Mandan.178  In that case, the city and its project manager failed to obtain 
timely easements for the contractor to access land needed in connection 
with a storm sewer improvement contract, resulting in costly delays to the 
contractor.179  This contract also contained a no damages for delay 
 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 15.411 (2016). 
171.  No Damage for Delay: A Work of Contractual Fiction, supra note 165. 
172.  C & C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County, 2014 ND 128, ¶¶ 2-3, 848 
N.W.2d 709, 712. 
173.  Id. ¶ 8, 848 N.W.2d at 713-14. 
174.  Id. ¶ 15, 848 N.W.2d at 716. 
175.  Id. (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 668 F.2d 435, 438 (8th 
Cir. 1982)). 
176.  Id. ¶ 16, 848 N.W.2d at 717. 
177.  Id. ¶ 13, 848 N.W.2d at 716. 
178.  Markwed Excavating, Inc. v. City of Mandan, 2010 ND 220, ¶ 20, 791 N.W.2d 22, 30. 
179.  Id. ¶ 6, 791 N.W.2d at 25. 
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clause.180  In this case, the Supreme Court declined to adopt a wholesale 
exception for delays not contemplated by the parties as some jurisdictions 
have.181  Instead, it concluded that the plain language of the provision in 
this case was broad and unambiguous such that it encompassed work delays 
by “any act or neglect” of the city or any other contractors employed by the 
city, regardless of foreseeability.182  To hold otherwise would render the 
clause—the purpose of which is to allocate the risk of unforeseeable 
delays—meaningless.183  The contractor, thus, had to absorb the costs 
associated with the delay of the project.184 
These two cases suggest that North Dakota courts will continue to 
enforce no damages for delay clauses except where there has been active 
interference by the owner.  Accordingly, such clauses will remain common 
in construction contracts where North Dakota law applies. 
No damages for delay clauses are not drafted uniformly; they take 
many forms and sometimes are not even titled as such.  Counsel for 
contractors and subcontractors may struggle to develop strategies to limit 
these risk-shifting provisions at the drafting stage.  One drafting strategy is 
to articulate the types of damages (e.g., additional time, additional money) 
that constitute permissible delay damages versus those that are precluded.  
When drafting one, the clause should provide clearly for additional time 
without penalty, but no additional money, in the event of delay.  If the 
clause allows extra time as the sole remedy for delay, then counsel and 
contracting parties should heed case law indicating that the benefitted party 
must actually grant the extra time to the delayed party.185 
Contractors and their counsel may have more litigation than 
transactional tools to combat these clauses.  As a threshold matter, counsel 
should know that the application and enforceability of these clauses is state-
specific.  Accordingly, a choice of law clause in an agreement will affect 
the scope and enforceability of any no damages for delay clause.  Some 
state statutes preclude enforcement of no damages for delay clauses in 
 
180.  Id. ¶ 4, 791 N.W.2d at 24. 
181.  Id. ¶¶ 13, 19, 791 N.W.2d at 27, 29. 
182.  Id. ¶ 20. 
183.  Id. ¶ 23. 
184.  See generally Markwed Excavating, Inc., ¶ 23, 791 N.W.2d at 23. 
185.  See, e.g., Cent. Ceilings, Inc. v. Suffolk Constr. Co. Inc., No. SUCV200604129A, 2013 
WL 8721044 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2013). 
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public contracts.186  In other states, these clauses are void and invalid in all 
construction contracts—public and private.187   
 Further, as the cases above illustrate, other factors affect the application 
and enforceability of a no damages for delay clause, including the contract 
language, the actions of the parties, as well as state statutes and decisional 
law that address defenses to enforcement of these clauses.  Defenses to 
enforcement of these clauses is a matter of case law development in North 
Dakota but is governed by statute in other states.  Counsel may be able to 
raise any number of defenses to enforcement of these clauses, including, but 
not limited to, the active interference exception, fraud, and unreasonable 
delay, as well as traditional contract arguments such as waiver, duress, 
rescission, mistake, unconscionable terms, and ambiguity.188  Finally, other 
jurisdictions may recognize a broader list of exceptions than those available 
under North Dakota law.  In short, attorneys should draft a no damages for 
delay clause against the backdrop of what the relevant jurisdiction’s law 
permits and requires. 
B.  INDEMNIFICATION & HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSES 
Recent case law has also addressed the scope of a company’s 
contractual indemnity obligations and the limitations North Dakota law 
imposes on such contractual obligations.189 
An indemnity clause is a contractual term that requires one party to 
reimburse another for its liability and damages arising out of the contract.190  
Construction companies utilize indemnity clauses to allocate the risk 
associated with damage to property or persons in connection with a 
 
186.  See MINN. STAT. § 15.411 (2016); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7203 (2016) (“A public 
works contract entered into on or after January 1, 2016, that contains a clause that expressly 
requires a contractor to be responsible for delay damages is not enforceable unless the delay 
damages have been liquidated to a set amount and identified in the public works contract.”). 
187.  WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.360 (2016). 
188.  See generally Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: 
A Proposed Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1857, 1860-70 (2005). 
189.  See e,g., Chapman v. Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, 49 F.Supp.3d 649 (D.N.D. 
2014); Specialized Contracting, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2012 ND 259, 825 
N.W.2d 872. 
190.  “Indemnity is a contract by which one engages to save another from a legal 
consequence of the conduct of one of the parties or of some other person.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 
22–02–01 (2015).  “Indemnification is a remedy which allows a party to recover reimbursement 
from another for the discharge of a liability which, as between them, should have been discharged 
by the other.”  Specialized Contracting, Inc., ¶ 14, 825 N.W.2d at 877 (quoting Olander 
Contracting Co. v. Gail Wachter Inv., 2002 ND 65, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 29, 36). 
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project.191  Often, the company with more bargaining power leverages that 
influence to obtain agreement to a clause that shifts substantial liability to 
the other party, sometimes even for that company’s own negligence.192 
In North Dakota, indemnity clauses are interpreted using ordinary 
principles of contract interpretation193 as well as a set of statutory rules.194  
Pursuant to statute, indemnity provisions that protect parties from 
responsibility for their own willful or negligent injury to some other person 
or property are invalid.195  North Dakota also invalidates indemnity 
provisions in construction contracts, which hold contractors liable for 
erroneous acts or omissions of owners (or their agents) in both design plans 
and specifications.196 
In addition to the indemnity provisions typically included in 
contractual agreements, “additional insured” provisions, in conjunction with 
“hold harmless” language, may also be included by companies as a 
supplementary layer of protection from liability.197  By adding these 
provisions, the indemnitee (typically an owner or general contractor) is 
protected from liability by the insurer of the indemnitor.198 
In Chapman v. Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, Chapman sued 
Hiland, the owner/operator of a natural gas processing facility, for injuries 
sustained in an explosion that occurred while Chapman was removing water 
from tanks at the gas plant to haul away.199  Prior to the injury, Hiland had 
contracted with Missouri Basin Well Service, Inc. (“Missouri Basin”) for 
certain plant operation services.200  Missouri Basin, in turn, subcontracted 
certain water hauling services to B&B Heavy Haul, LLC (“B&B”), in 
 
191.  See Specialized Contracting, Inc., ¶ 14, 825 N.W.2d at 877 (explaining the purpose and 
effect of indemnity clauses). 
192.  Roger W. Stone & Jeffrey A. Stone, Indemnity in Iowa Construction Law, 54 DRAKE 
L. REV. 125, 130 (2005) (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 
523 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also Dean B. Thompson & Colin Bruns, Indemnity Wars: Anti-Indemnity 
Legislation Across the Fifty States, 8 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION LAWS. 1 (2014), 
http://www.fwhtlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Anti-Indemnity-Legislation-Across-the-
Fifty-States.pdf. 
193.  Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 653. 
194.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-02-07 (2015) (explaining the “[r]ules applied in 
interpretation of a contract of indemnity”). 
195.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02 (2015). 
196.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02.1 (2015). 
197.  Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 654; see Specialized Contracting, Inc., ¶ 29, 825 N.W.2d 
at 882. 
198.  See Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 654. 
199.  Id. at 651-52.  
200.  Id. at 651. 
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which B&B agreed to indemnify Missouri Basin from certain liability.201  
Hiland filed a third-party complaint against Missouri Basin and B&B, 
Chapman’s employer, arguing that Hiland was entitled to indemnification 
and defense from Missouri Basin and B&B even if the harm was a result of 
Hiland’s own negligence.202  B&B moved for summary judgment on claims 
asserted against it, by both Hiland and Missouri Basin.203 
The issue in Hiland’s third-party complaint was whether B&B had to 
indemnify Hiland for Hiland’s own negligence based on an indemnity 
provision in the unsigned subcontract Missouri Basin entered into with 
B&B.204  The court ultimately concluded that there was no legal basis for 
such a result.205  North Dakota case law previously permitted the 
indemnification of a party’s own negligence if the intent was explicitly 
provided for in the contract.206  Here, there was no such intent.207 
In North Dakota, when a contract contains both the hold harmless and 
additional insured insurance provision language, there is little question the 
parties intended that the indemnitee be indemnified against the 
consequences of its own negligence.  Specifically, the Supreme Court has 
held that standard hold harmless provisions which agree to indemnify a 
party against “any and all claims” are construed to include a “promise to 
protect and defend” the indemnified party against all third-party claims.208  
Pursuant to the contract between Hiland and Missouri Basin, Hiland was 
named as an additional insured on the Missouri Basin liability insurance 
policy.209  In other words, unmistakable intent of broad indemnification 
obligations is evidenced by the inclusion of both hold harmless and 
additional insured insurance provisions in a contract. 
Here, the unsigned contract between Missouri Basin and B&B provides 
that B&B will “save harmless” Missouri Basin and the Customer from “any 
and all claims” including those that arise from Missouri Basin’s 
negligence.210  As well, the subcontract required Missouri Basin to be listed 
 
201.  Id. 
202.  Id. at 651-52. 
203.  Id. at 652. 
204.  Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 652. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Rupp v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 465 N.W.2d 614, 616 (N.D. 1991); Bridston v. Dover 
Corp., 352 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (N.D. 1984). 
207.  Chapman, 49 F.Supp.3d at 655-56. 
208.  Bridston, 352 N.W.2d at 197. 
209.  Chapman, 49 F.Supp.3d at 654. 
210.  Id. at 655. 
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as an additional insured on B&B’s liability insurance policy.211  On that 
basis, the court found that the unsigned contract between Missouri Basin 
and B&B expressed an intent that B&B indemnify Missouri Basin for 
B&B’s negligence and Missouri Basin’s own negligence.212  There was no 
mention, however, of B&B indemnifying Missouri Basin or Hiland for 
Hiland’s negligence, nor was Hiland specifically granted additional insured 
status under the B&B contract.213  The court concluded, there was no clear 
intent concerning B&B’s obligation to Hiland because, while the “save 
harmless” language was present, the additional insured insurance 
requirement as applicable to Hiland was clearly absent.214  Construing the 
ambiguity against Hiland, the party seeking indemnification, the court held 
that B&B did not have to indemnify Hiland for Hiland’s own negligence.215 
The court also ruled the indemnity clause was void and unenforceable 
under statute.216  In 2009, the North Dakota legislature enacted an anti-
indemnification statute, which prohibits a motor carrier transportation 
agreement containing any indemnity, duty to defend, or hold harmless 
provision, or an agreement that “has the effect of indemnifying, defending, 
or holding harmless” an indemnitee for their own negligence.217  The court 
ruled that the indemnity clause in the Missouri Basin-B&B agreement was 
void and unenforceable under that statute.218 
In addition, Missouri Basin filed a cross-claim against B&B, claiming 
that under the subcontract, Missouri Basin was entitled to indemnification 
for any liability that flowed from Hiland to Missouri Basin regarding 
Chapman’s injuries pursuant to the prime agreement.219  Specifically, 
Missouri Basin posited that its contract with Hiland and its subcontract with 
B&B should be read together as a single transaction, in effect, allowing 
Missouri Basin’s indemnification obligations to Hiland to pass-through to 
B&B.220  The court rejected this argument noting that the two contracts 
involved different parties and were separately negotiated years apart.221  In 
particular, the court found it relevant that the subcontract between Missouri 
 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. at 655-56. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 656. 
216.  Id. 
217.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-02-10(2) (2015). 
218.  Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 656. 
219.  Id. at 657. 
220.  Id. 
221.  Id. 
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Basin and B&B made no reference to the contract between Hiland and 
Missouri Basin nor any liability Missouri Basin may have assumed in the 
prime contract.222  Accordingly, the court found that B&B had taken on no 
contractual responsibility for Hiland’s negligence that Missouri Basin had 
assumed in the prime contract.223 
This case highlights how North Dakota courts strictly construe an 
ambiguity in an indemnity provision against the indemnitee.224  But its 
implications are much broader.  Parties must carefully craft provisions that 
reflect the parties’ intent regarding indemnification risk allocation.  
Specifically, subcontracts should reference prime contracts, include 
flowdown provisions, and incorporate indemnification obligations from the 
prime contract that the parties want the subcontractor to assume.  Finally, 
indemnification provisions, standing alone, do not settle indemnification 
liability questions.  Hold harmless provisions along with certain insurance 
requirements can have a determinative effect on indemnification 
obligations. 
C.  FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE 
The North Dakota Supreme Court examined the enforceability of a 
force majeure clause for the first time in Entzel v. Moritz Sport & 
Marine.225  A “force majeure” clause is a contract provision that relieves the 
parties from performing their contractual obligations when certain defined 
circumstances beyond their control arise, making performance inadvisable, 
commercially impracticable, illegal, or impossible.226 
In this case, Entzel entered into a Boat Space Rental Agreement with 
Moritz and pre-paid for use of a marina boat slip on the Missouri River in 
Mandan, for the period of May 15, 2011, through October 1, 2011.227  That 
agreement included a force majeure clause.228  Entzel did not use the slip at 
 
222.  Id. at 658. 
223.  Id. 
224.  Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 656. 
225.  Entzel v. Moritz Sport and Marine, 2014 ND 12, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d 774, 778 
(“Generally, this Court’s cases have examined force majeure, also called ‘acts of God,’ in the 
context of liability for negligence and liability in cases where no clause was present in a contract.  
However, in this case, the force majeure clause was specifically written into the contract.”). 
226.  Force-Majeure Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a force-
majeure clause as “[a] contractual provision allocating the risk of loss if performance becomes 
impossible or impracticable, esp[ecially] as a result of an event or effect that the parties could not 
have anticipated or controlled”). 
227.  Entzel, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d at 776-77. 
228.  Id. ¶ 3, 841 N.W.2d at 777.  Paragraph 10 of the agreement provided: “The 
LANDLORD will not be responsible for delays in hauling, launching, winter lay-up or 
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the beginning of the leasing period.229  Due to the threat of a flood, the city 
of Mandan instructed Moritz to take precautionary action concerning the 
boats stored there.230  As a result, on May 26, Moritz notified Entzel that 
owners had to remove their boats from the slips due to imminent 
flooding.231  Moritz failed to tell Entzel when her boat could be returned to 
the marina, and Entzel did not use the slip during the lease term.232  Other 
Moritz customers, however, used their slips from mid-June through the end 
of the season.233  Entzel sued Moritz in small claims court alleging breach 
of contract and sought to recover the slip rental fee.”234  Moritz removed the 
action to district court and defended that the force majeure clause in the 
contract relieved it from liability.235 
The Supreme Court held that the force majeure clause in the contract 
relieved Moritz of liability and allocated the risk of loss to Entzel.236  The 
clause, by its plain language, applied to delays in use of the slip that were 
beyond the control of the Moritz, namely the imminent flood.237 
The Supreme Court’s first foray into interpreting force majeure clauses 
is rather straightforward.  It does not offer much guidance for attorneys who 
draft or litigate the clauses beyond two well-known principles: (1) the 
specific language of the clause is most important; and (2) the party asserting 
a force majeure clause to excuse performance may have to prove that the 
triggering event was beyond its control.238 
Counsel in North Dakota should be aware of some general 
considerations relevant to drafting an effective force majeure clause.  First, 
in the absence of a negotiated force majeure clause, contracting parties are 
left to invoke common law doctrines of impracticability and frustration of 
purpose, which rarely excuse performance.  Accordingly, parties may deem 
it prudent to employ a force majeure clause as a tool to allocate the risk of 
nonperformance in certain defined circumstances. 
 
commissioning, occasioned by inclement weather or any other circumstances beyond its control.” 
Id. 
229.  Id. ¶ 2. 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Entzel, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d at 777. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. ¶ 3. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. ¶ 11, 841 N.W.2d at 779. 
237.  Id. ¶ 10. 
238.  Entzel, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d at 778 (explaining “[w]hat types of events constitute force 
majeure depend on the specific language included in the clause itself”). 
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Having decided to include a force majeure clause, parties must 
determine the types of events and circumstances it will cover.  Parties have 
the freedom to define the events that will trigger the clause.239  The typical 
clause encompasses natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, 
and weather disturbances sometimes referred to as “acts of God.”240  Courts 
tend to interpret force majeure clauses narrowly—only the enumerated 
events, or sufficiently similar events, will be covered.241 
Counsel should also recognize the need for careful drafting of the 
language that comes before and after the list of covered events.  For 
example, courts have recognized limits to the use of a catch-all provision in 
these clauses, such as “causes beyond the parties’ control.”242  Courts 
generally construe such broad language as limited to unforeseeable rather 
than foreseeable events.243 
In Entzel, however, the Supreme Court potentially departed from this 
majority approach when it noted that “[n]ot every force majeure event need 
be beyond the parties’ reasonable control to still qualify as an excuse” for 
nonperformance even though this force majeure clause contained express 
language to the contrary.244  This dicta creates some ambiguity for 
transacting parties, counsel, and courts because it suggests that North 
Dakota courts embrace a broader view of the types of events that will 
excuse nonperformance based on the force majeure clause. 
Additionally, the language that follows the list of triggering events can 
alter the scope of the force majeure clause.  For example, where parties add 
the words “or any other emergency beyond the parties’ control” to the end 
of a list of triggering events, they unintentionally may narrow the clause to 
events that, in a court’s view, qualify as emergencies.245 
 
239.  See id. 
240.  See Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 31 N.E.3d 80, 81-82 (N.Y. 2015) 
(“Generally, a force majeure event is an event beyond the control of the parties that prevents 
performance under a contract and may excuse nonperformance.”). 
241.  See, e.g., In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F.Supp.2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); 
see also 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2014). 
242.  See, e.g., Clean Uniform Co. St. Louis v. Magic Touch Cleaning, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 602, 
608, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
243.  Id. at 610. 
244.  Entzel, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d at 778. 
245.  See, e.g., Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App. 1998).  The 
disputed force majeure clause in this oil and gas lease litigation contained a list of triggering 
events followed by the catch-all phrase, “any cause whatsoever beyond the control of the Lessee.”  
Id. at 280.  The court held that because the catch-all phrase followed the list of triggering events, it 
qualified each of those events with the result that an event could be a force majeure one for 
purposes of the lease only if it was “outside of [a party’s] “reasonable control.”  Id. at 288. 
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Finally, as with any contractual provision, counsel should examine and 
assess whether the specific type of transaction demands certain language to 
protect one or both of the contracting parties.  For example, there is some 
evidence that force majeure clauses are increasingly important in oil and 
gas leases.246  In at least one case, a mineral lessee unsuccessfully invoked a 
force majeure clause as a result of government regulation in an attempt to 
extend its lease term.247  Counsel to mineral lessors and lessees should 
examine and assess whether the nature of the transaction presents special 
drafting considerations for force majeure provisions, such as expressly 
negating its applicability to acts of government regulation that might 
interfere with leasing rights. 
D.  PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION & PUGH CLAUSES 
There has also been an increase in actions seeking to enforce the 
validity of oil and gas leases.  In North Dakota, the rules governing 
interpretation of contracts apply to oil and gas leases.248  Accordingly, all 
contracts are interpreted to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the 
time of contracting.249  Two recent cases invited courts to construe Pugh 
clauses in oil and gas leases using ordinary principles of contract 
interpretation.250 
A Pugh clause is a term in an oil and gas lease that severs the lease as 
to areas of the subject property that do not contain a producing unit after the 
initial term of the lease has expired.251  It is designed to protect a lessor 
from having all of her lands held captive by the lease based on production 
from a small portion of the property.252  “North Dakota law generally 
 
246.  See Joshua A. Swanson, The Hand of God: Limiting the Impact of the Force Majeure 
Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 89 N.D. L. REV. 225, 225 (2013) (“This Article focuses on the 
growing importance of the force majeure clause in oil and gas leases and discusses what mineral 
owners can do to protect themselves against the unintended consequences of allowing the force 
majeure clause to turn every event into an ‘Act of God’ that extends their lease indefinitely 
without production or drilling operations.”).  See also Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your Excuse? An 
Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91 (2007). 
247.  See Aukema v Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210-11 (N.D.N.Y. 
2012) (holding that executive action suspending fracking, pending the completion of 
environmental impact assessments, did not qualify as a force majeure event under the leases). 
248.  Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, ¶ 9, 848 N.W.2d 691, 695 reh’g 
denied (Jul. 17, 2014); Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d 861, 864. 
249.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–07–03 (2015). 
250.  See Tank, ¶¶ 6-7, 848 N.W.2d at 694-95; N. Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen, 808 F.3d 373, 
377 (8th Cir. 2015). 
251.  Moen, 808 F.3d at 377 (citing Tank, ¶ 14, 848 N.W.2d at 697). 
252.  Id. at 375 (citing Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 
1992)). 
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presumes that oil and gas leases are indivisible,” meaning that production 
on any part of the leased lands will maintain the lease beyond its initial term 
for all land covered by the lease.253  A Pugh clause must “clearly and 
explicitly” divide the land in order to defeat this presumption.254 
In Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen, the parties disputed the 
continued validity of an oil and gas lease based on conflicting 
interpretations of the Pugh clause.255  The lease provided for an initial term 
of five years and extended beyond that term as long as the lessee was 
operating on the land.256  However, the lease also contained a Pugh 
clause.257  That clause terminated the lease at the end of the initial term as 
to all land except for land located “within the same section of a production 
unit or spacing unit” on which there was “a well producing or capable of 
producing” commercial quantities of oil or gas.258  The disputed issue was 
whether the language in the Pugh clause of the contract severed the lease at 
section boundaries or spacing unit boundaries.259  The Moens claimed that 
the Pugh clause divided the lease at spacing-unit boundaries, while 
Northern Oil claimed that the Pugh clause divided the lease at section 
boundaries.260 
The Eighth Circuit applied ordinary principles of contract interpretation 
and held that the Pugh clause divided the lease at section boundaries rather 
than spacing boundaries.261  The court invoked the canon that requires that 
words in a contract be construed according to their “ordinary and popular” 
meaning, unless the parties defined the words according to their technical 
meaning.262  Looking to the ordinary meaning of the term “section” as it is 
defined in the real estate context in Black’s Law Dictionary and in Williams 
& Meyers Oil and Gas Law Manual of Terms—a one-square-mile tract of 
land (640 acres)—as well as the parties use of the term “section” in other 
parts of the lease to refer to Public Land System Survey (PLSS) sections, 
 
253.  Id. at 376 (citing Tank, ¶ 12, 848 N.W.2d at 696). 
254.  Id. at 377 (quoting Egeland, ¶ 17, 616 N.W.2d at 867). 
255.  Id. at 374-75. 
256.  Id. at 375. 
257.  Moen, 808 F.3d at 375. 
258.  Id. at 375-76. 
259.  Id. at 376. 
260.  Id. 
261.  Id. at 376-77 (citing Grynberg v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 599 N.W.2d 261, 265 (N.D. 
1999)) (“North Dakota courts construe words in their ordinary and popular sense unless the parties 
use them in a technical sense.”); see also Grynberg, 599 N.W.2d at 265 (explaining that “[a] 
contract must be construed as a whole to give effect to each provision, if reasonably possible”). 
262.  Moen, 808 F.3d at 376. 
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the court concluded that the parties intended to divide the lease at section 
boundaries.263  The result is that the lease remained valid as to the disputed 
area because production from other areas in the same section maintained the 
lease as to the entire section.264 
The North Dakota Supreme Court entertained the interpretation of a 
Pugh clause in Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corporation about a year 
earlier.265  The lease at issue in Tank contained a continuous drilling 
operations clause that conflicted with a Pugh clause.266  The drilling clause, 
if construed broadly, would have rendered the Pugh clause inoperative.267  
The Supreme Court interpreted the lease to give effect to both clauses, 
relying primarily on two rules of contract interpretation.268  First, it applied 
the general principle that words in a contract—including an oil and gas 
lease—must be construed according to their “ordinary and popular” 
meaning, unless the parties defined the words according to their technical 
meaning.269  It also applied the rule that a contract must be interpreted as a 
whole and in a manner that gives effect to every provision, if possible.270  
Applying these contract interpretation principles, the Supreme Court upheld 
the Pugh clause in Tank in favor of the landowners.271 
These decisions have implications for drafting oil and gas leases in 
North Dakota, some of which are outside the scope of this Article and 
require subject matter expertise beyond general contracting principles.272  
That said, it is worth noting counsel should be mindful that these rulings 
call attention to foundational drafting principles that are relevant to any 
transaction.  It is important with any draft written agreement to anticipate 
all the ways the transaction might unfold and contemplate how that 
sequence of events will play out under the provisions as written.  Such an 
exercise will demonstrate for counsel and their clients how the various 
provisions of the contract interact with one another. 
 
263.  Id. at 377-78. 
264.  Id. at 379-80. 
265.  Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas, Corp., 2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691.  For a lengthier 
discussion of this case, see Jesse Liebe, Case Comment, Contracts — Mines and Minerals: North 
Dakota Rejects Extension of Oil Production Contracts on Unused Land: Tank v. Citation Oil & 
Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691, 90 N.D. L. REV. 427 (2014). 
266.  Tank, ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d at 699-700. 
267.  Id. ¶ 28. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. ¶ 41, 858 N.W.2d at 702 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
270.  Id. ¶¶ 17, 28, 858 N.W.2d at 696, 700; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (2015). 
271.  Tank, ¶ 25, 858 N.W.2d at 699. 
272.  See Liebe, supra note 265. 
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E.  RIGHT OF FIRST OFFER V. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 
In Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Company, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that a clause in the contract was a right 
of first offer, rather than a right of first refusal, despite conflicting language 
in the contract.273  The contract included a purported right of first refusal, as 
it was titled.274  It also included a handwritten sentence above the printed 
“First Right of Refusal” clause, providing for a fixed-price option to 
purchase.275  That clause provided: “This has changed to a three-year 
purchase option to run concurrently.”276  Constellation tried to exercise the 
option to purchase, but ultimately failed to furnish the required 
consideration.277 
The parties disagreed about whether the contract provided for an option 
to purchase or a right of first refusal.278  The Supreme Court declined to 
decide whether the addition of the handwritten option created an ambiguity, 
because the right of first refusal (“ROFR”), though titled as such, was 
actually a right of first offer (“ROFO”).279  Looking to the substance of the 
clause rather than the title or label attached to it, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the text of the clause more closely resembled a right of first 
offer because it spoke in terms of the seller’s decision to sell, and it did not 
require Western to inform Constellation of any third-party offers for the 
property before it could sell to a third party, which is a feature consistent 
with a right of first refusal.280  Further, Western’s notice triggered the right 
of first offer, but Constellation did nothing to accept the offer.281 
A right of first offer requires an owner to give the holder the first 
opportunity to buy the subject property after the owner decides to sell it.282  
A right of first refusal grants the holder the right to match the terms of any 
 
273.  Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, ¶ 15, 882 N.W.2d 238, 243. 
274. Id. ¶ 2, 882 N.W.2d at 240 (The contract provided: “FIRST RIGHT OF REFUSAL: The 
Seller will grant and give to the Buyer the First Right of Refusal for 5 years on the additional 62 
acres as shown on Exhibit “B” attached to this Agreement should the Seller decide to sell any 
more land.  The purchase price in reference to the additional land will be at $18,000.00 per acre if 
the Seller decides to sell additional land.  If Seller decides to sell more land the Buyer will have 14 
days to enter into a Purchase Agreement and 30 days to close the transaction or he will lose his 
First Right of Refusal.”). 
275.  Id. ¶ 10, 882 N.W.2d at 242. 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. ¶ 9, 882 N.W.2d at 241-42. 
278.  Id. ¶ 10, 882 N.W.2d at 242. 
279.  Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 10, 882 N.W.2d at 242. 
280.  Id. ¶ 15, 882 N.W.2d at 244. 
281.  Id. 
282.  Id. ¶ 14, 882 N.W.2d at 243. 
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third party offers the owner has received on the subject property and then 
purchase the property or pass on the deal.283  The main difference between a 
right of first refusal and a right of first offer is the triggering event.  A right 
of first refusal is triggered when the owner receives an offer from a third 
party and decides to sell.  In contrast, a right of first offer is triggered when 
the owner decides to offer the property for sale, period, without first 
receiving an offer from a third party.284  The provision here, though titled a 
right of first refusal, made no mention of a sale to a third party.285 
This decision highlights for counsel the imperative of identifying a 
client’s business objectives in connection with a transaction and then 
translating those objectives into carefully drafted provisions.286  For 
example, counsel for property owners should be aware that ROFRs raise a 
concern that third parties may be less inclined to consider a purchase 
because the holder of the ROFR can exercise its right to buy the property 
under terms the third party assembled. 
Counsel for holders, on the other hand, should note that a ROFO puts a 
greater burden on the holder to carefully consider when and how to draft the 
offer terms.  A ROFO does not know how the owner values the property.  
Accordingly, the holder and its counsel have to decide whether to have the 
owner set price and other terms in advance, at the time of the granting of the 
right, or later when the holder exercises the right.  Typically, the 
transactional documents will provide that the owner shall provide a notice 
to the holder of its decision to sell.  That notice triggers the ROFO and 
specifies the price and terms the owner is willing to accept.  This eliminates 
the risk for the holder that its offer will undervalue the property. 
Some foundational drafting considerations include the following: (1) 
identify what triggers the right, and consider identifying what does not 
trigger the right; (2) accurately describe the property (or asset) that is the 
subject of the right; (3) state the price and other essential terms, or 
alternatively, indicate that the owner’s notice will provide such terms; and 
(4) stipulate what constitutes acceptance of the notice, including how long 
the holder has to accept and the consequences of a failure to respond.  
 
283.  Id. 
284.  Id. 
285.  Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶¶ 13-15, 882 N.W.2d at 243-44. 
286.  Arguably, there is ambiguity concerning what the parties’ intended—a right of first 
offer or a right of first refusal.  The ruling does not indicate whether the parties had any extrinsic 
evidence to proffer which would have revealed the parties’ actual intent.  Further, the Supreme 
Court’s decision appears to foreclose consideration of any extrinsic evidence on this point, when it 
concludes that the substance of the provision is clearly a right of first offer despite the titling of 
the provision as a right of first refusal. 
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Counsel for all parties should also keep in mind that common law contract 
doctrines may apply in the absence of the parties’ agreement as to specific 
issues.  There are many other considerations concerning the drafting of 
rights of first refusal and first offer, but these are merely the most basic 
ones. 
VI.  DEFENSES OF FORMATION OR ENFORCEMENT 
A party to contract litigation may assert any number of doctrines as an 
affirmative defense to avoid enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.  
Noteworthy decisions from the survey period involve failure of 
consideration, statute of frauds, and fraud. 
A.  FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION 
Recent case law has addressed the failure of consideration as opposed 
to the lack of sufficient or adequate consideration.  Failure of consideration 
is an affirmative defense to enforcement of an otherwise valid contract, 
typically asserted where the other party has failed to perform its side of the 
bargain.287  When asserted successfully, rescission is ordinarily the 
remedy.288 
In North Dakota, substantial performance constitutes sufficient 
consideration.289  In Pegg v. Kohn, the North Dakota Supreme Court held 
that a party’s assertion of failure of consideration to avoid enforcement 
must fail where the other party substantially performed his contractual 
obligations.290  Pegg, an electrician, was dissatisfied with his job because 
the company refused to pay him a percentage of revenue from one of his 
significant clients.291  Pegg proposed a partnership with Kohn in Kohn’s 
company, with Pegg contributing his client account and the attendant 
revenue, as well as $10,000 of capital.292  Under the partnership, Pegg 
would receive an hourly rage, ten percent of the partnership’s net revenue, 
and ten percent of the gross revenue generated by his client’s business.293  
No written agreement existed, but Pegg began working and contributed 
significantly to the business including paying about $9000 for a truck titled 
 
287.  Brash v. Gulleson, 2013 ND 156, ¶ 13, 835 N.W.2d 798, 802–03. 
288.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02 (2015). 
289.  Pegg v. Kohn, 2015 ND 79, 861 N.W.2d 764. 
290.  Id. ¶ 12, 861 N.W.2d at 767. 
291.  Id. ¶ 3, 861 N.W.2d at 765. 
292.  Id. 
293.  Id. 
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in the partnership’s name plus the costs of tools and equipment.294  Later, 
Kohn denied existence of the partnership, so Pegg sued for breach of the 
oral partnership agreement.295 
Kohn argued a failure of consideration because Pegg did not pay the 
entire $10,000 due under the oral agreement.296  The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the longstanding rule that a party’s substantial performance 
constitutes sufficient consideration to make the contract binding and permit 
that party to recover for breach of contract.297 
In contrast, in Brash v. Gulleson, the defendant successfully asserted 
failure of consideration to avoid enforcement of a contract.298  In that case, 
the parties entered into a lease agreement which directed Brash to provide 
130 cows to Gulleson’s farm as well as replacement cows to maintain the 
herd at that number.299  The record amply demonstrated that Brash failed to 
furnish or maintain 130 cows during subsequent years, despite the 
contractual language to the contrary.300  Gulleson raised failure of 
consideration to avoid enforcement of the contract.301  The district court 
concluded, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that there was a failure of 
consideration, which rendered the contract unenforceable.302 
These two cases illustrate the extreme ends of the spectrum with regard 
to furnishing consideration: substantial—indeed ninety percent—
performance in Pegg contrasts with the Brash plaintiffs’ near total failure of 
consideration.  These cases reiterate longstanding law in the state 
concerning substantial performance and failure of consideration while 
offering some benchmark standards for counsel to use in a litigation 
posture.  First, Brash reaffirms that failure of consideration means “the 
failure to perform a substantial part of its obligation.”303  A less clear 
 
294.  Id. 
295.  Pegg, 2015 ND 79, ¶ 3, 861 N.W.2d at 765.  The parties did not raise any statute of 
frauds issue.  Id. 
296.  Id. ¶ 11, 861 N.W.2d at 767. 
297.  Id. ¶ 12; see also Curtis Constr. Co., Inc. v. American Steel Span, Inc., 2005 ND 218, ¶ 
19, 707 N.W.2d 68, 74; Bismarck Realty Co. v. Folden, 354 N.W.2d 636, 641 (N.D. 1984); 
Kruger v. Soreide, 246 N.W.2d 764, 773 (N.D. 1976); United States v. Dura–Lux Int’l Corp., 529 
F.2d 659, 662–63 (8th Cir. 1976) (explaining that if “substantial performance was rendered . . . the 
defense of failure of consideration cannot succeed”). 
298.  Brash v. Gulleson, 2013 ND 156, ¶ 25, 835 N.W.2d 798, 806. 
299.  Id. ¶ 15, 835 N.W.2d at 798. 
300.  Id. ¶ 24, 835 N.W.2d at 805-06. 
301.  Id. ¶ 25, 835 N.W.2d at 806. 
302.  Id. 
303.  Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 20, 794 N.W.2d 715, 720. 
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standard governs substantial performance:304 a “good faith attempt to 
perform” constitutes substantial performance as long as the “essential 
purpose” of the contract is achieved, even where the performance is not 
exactly according to the agreement’s terms.305 
B.  STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Like failure of consideration, a party may assert failure to comply with 
the statute of frauds to avoid enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.  
During the survey period, the North Dakota Supreme Court heard and ruled 
on a handful of disputes that involved the statute of frauds and how it 
interacts with promissory estoppel doctrine.306  Arguably, the more 
interesting statute of frauds case is Trosen v. Trosen, described below, 
where the Supreme Court did not invoke sua sponte a rule which would 
have permitted the contract to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
In Trosen v. Trosen, Shirley Trosen owned farmland and leased tracts 
separately to her sons, Jeff and Brent.307  She entered into a three-year 
written lease agreement with Jeff on January 1, 2011.308  The agreement, 
however, failed to specify the amount of rent, i.e., the consideration.309  The 
week that the parties signed the lease, Jeff also tendered to Shirley a check 
dated “Jan. 2011” for $28,522 with “2011 farm land” indicated in the memo 
line.310  Shirley did not cash the check and eventually returned it.311  Shirley 
then allowed her other son, Brent, to farm the land.312  As a consequence, 
Jeff sued for breach of contract and damages, as well as equitable relief.313 
In North Dakota, a sufficient memorandum for purposes of satisfying 
the statute of frauds must state the parties’ identity, the agreement’s subject 
matter, and the consideration, and it must be signed by the party attempting 
to escape enforcement of the contract.314  The Supreme Court concluded 
 
304.  “There is no fixed formula by which [substantial performance] can be determined 
because the word ‘substantial’, the meat of the doctrine, in this context, is a relative term.”  Pegg 
v. Kohn, 2015 ND 79, ¶ 12, 861 N.W.2d 764, 767 (quoting Dittmer v. Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d 
201, 208 (N.D.1974)). 
305.  Pegg ¶ 12, 861 N.W.2d at 767 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
306.  See supra Section III.B. 
307.  Trosen v. Trosen, 2014 ND 7, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d 687, 690. 
308.  Id. ¶ 4. 
309.  Id. ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d at 692. 
310.  Id. ¶ 3, 841 N.W.2d at 690. 
311.  Id. ¶ 6, 841 N.W.2d at 691. 
312.  Id. 
313.  Trosen, ¶¶ 6-7, 841 N.W.2d at 691. 
314.  Id. ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d at 692. 
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that this lease agreement was clearly within the statute of frauds but was 
invalid because it failed to comply with the legal requirements for a 
sufficient memorandum.315  It failed because the written lease did not state 
the consideration—the rent.316 
The Supreme Court does not appear to address longstanding doctrine 
that permits a party to combine writings to satisfy the statute of frauds 
memorandum requirement.317  A memorandum need not be a single 
document in order to satisfy the statute of frauds.318  Rather, an agreement 
may satisfy the statute of frauds through a combination of separate writings 
“as long as they refer to each other and to the same persons and things, and 
manifestly relate to the same contract and transaction.”319  North Dakota 
decisional law embraces this approach: 
[The] memorandum need not be a complete contract in itself, but 
may consist of several documents, letters or telegrams, provided 
these documents show who are the contracting parties, 
intelligently identify the subject matter involved, express the 
consideration and disclose the terms and conditions upon which 
the contract is entered into.320 
The Supreme Court’s decision is silent as to the ability of a party to 
combine writings to satisfy the statute of frauds.  Arguably, the written 
lease combined with the check satisfies the memorandum requirements.  
The written lease fails to state the rent, but the check does indicate the rent, 
the parties’ identities, and refers to the lease in a notation on the check’s 
memo line.321  Accordingly, as long as Shirley has signed the written lease, 
she should not be able to escape enforcement of it based on a statute of 
frauds defense.322  Perhaps counsel failed to raise this issue, or perhaps 
there is some other reason combining the documents would be infeasible 
here.  Regardless, the decision provides counsel an opportunity to review 
the myriad ways to satisfy the statute of frauds memorandum requirements 
for litigation and client counseling purposes. 
 
315.  Id. ¶ 15, 841 N.W.2d at 693. 
316.  Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 841 N.W.2d at 692. 
317.  See id. 
318.  Johnson v. Auran, 214 N.W.2d 641, 650 (N.D. 1974). 
319.  Thomas J. Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 F. 291, 295 (8th Cir. 1913). 
320.  Id. (quoting Hoth v. Kahler, 74 N.W.2d 440, 441 (N.D. 1956)); see also Hoth, 74 
N.W.2d at 447 (quoting Goetz v. Hubbell, 266 N.W. 836, 838 (1936)) (explaining that “[a]ny kind 
of document or documents, taken singly or together, may constitute the required memorandum”). 
321.  Trosen v. Trosen, 2014 ND 7, ¶ 4, 841 N.W.2d 687, 690. 
322.  See Thomas J. Baird Inv. Co., 209 F. at 295. 
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C. FRAUD 
Fraud is another defense to enforcement of a contract that was before 
the North Dakota Supreme Court during the survey period.  In two different 
cases, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to distinguish the types of 
statements that constitute actual fraud from statements of opinion, which do 
not constitute fraud. 
In both cases, the Supreme Court’s starting point was a North Dakota 
statute that defines actual fraud as affirmatively stating a fact, known to be 
untrue, with intent to induce another to enter into a contract.323  Fraud also 
includes making factual statements that the party does not believe to be 
true, suppressing material facts known or believed to be true, and making a 
promise without any intention of performing it.324  Statements of opinion, 
or statements which amount to mere puffery or sales talk, do not constitute 
fraud.325 
In Ganske, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district 
court, which had concluded that alleged misrepresentations were mere sales 
talk, puffery, or opinion and were not material to the lessors fraudulent 
inducement claims.326  In this case, the lessee asserted numerous facts about 
its company’s success in past drilling operations as well as its readiness to 
drill on the lessors’ property.327  The Supreme Court held that the alleged 
misrepresentations in Ganske were well beyond mere puffery, sales talk, or 
statements of opinion in that the statements asserted specific, concrete facts 
which Golden Eye knew to be untrue and allegedly made to induce the 
lessors to enter into the disputed leases.328  In contrast, in Ward Farms 
Partnership v. Enerbase Cooperative Resources, the alleged fraud involved 
statements that a tractor for sale was “field ready” or “in good shape.”329  
The Supreme Court held that such statements were sales talk or puffery that 
did not rise to the level of fraud.330 
The juxtaposition of these two cases highlights the need to train field 
representatives about the outer limits of sales talk so that a business can 
protect itself against fraud actions. 
 
323.  N.D. CENT. CODE. § 9-03-08 (2015). 
324.  Golden Eye Res., LLC v. Ganske, 2014 ND 179, ¶ 23, 853 N.W.2d 544, 552. 
325.  Id. ¶ 23, 853 N.W.2d at 552-53. 
326.  Id. ¶ 24, 853 N.W.2d at 553. 
327.  Id. ¶ 25. 
328.  Id. 
329.  Ward Farms P’ship v. Enerbase Coop. Res., 2015 ND 136, ¶ 4, 863 N.W.2d 868, 871. 
330.  Id. ¶ 16, 863 N.W.2d at 873-74. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
There was an array of cases involving North Dakota contract law 
during the survey period from which one can extrapolate at least three 
themes concerning contracts law in North Dakota.  First, courts applying 
North Dakota contract law continue to embrace, rather than depart from, 
longstanding contract doctrine.  The number of instances in which the court 
reaffirms existing principles of contract law suggests that there are no 
watershed departures from existing norms on the horizon.  Second, courts 
applying North Dakota contract law look for practical, common sense 
approaches to interpreting clauses in ways that reflect contracting behavior 
and preserve the enforceability of the contract.  Lastly, there is a 
foreshadowing perhaps of issues to watch, particularly with respect to 
estoppel claims, preemptive rights—such as rights of first refusal and first 
offer—and interpretation issues arising under oil and gas leases and in 
construction contracts. 
 
